Muslim immigrants to Europe are distinctive on a number of attitudinal measures. In the U.K. Bisin et al. (2007; 2011a) show that the strength of ethnic identity among Muslim immigrants does not dissipate over time, while the strength of ethnic identity among non-Muslim immigrants does.
In France, Adida et al. (2012) compare a group of Senegalese Muslim and Christian immigrants on a number of attitudinal measures, and show that Senegalese Muslims exhibit greater attachment to their culture of origin and less attachment to their host country than do Senegalese Christians. One notable area of distinction has been attitudes toward women. In France, Brouard and Tiberj (2011) survey French immigrants and citizens, and reveal distinctive Muslim attitudes toward the status of women. Inglehart (2003) and Fish (2011) corroborate these patterns in their analyses of the World Values Surveys: Muslims are significantly more likely to agree that "a university education is more important for a boy than for a girl", to think that "when jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to a job than women", and to support the idea that "men make better political leaders than women do" [e.g. Fish (2011, pp. 181-193) ]. Alexander and Welzel (2011) confirm these findings, reporting that both Muslims in Muslim societies (where more than 50% of adults are Muslim) and Muslims in non-Muslim societies hold more "patriarchal" values than do non-Muslims. Less-well understood is whether distinctive Muslim attitudes translate into distinctive Muslim behavior. This question is critical if we are to understand Muslim immigrant integration, both economic and social, into European societies. Indeed, three possible mechanisms might link socio-economic integration with distinct behavior toward women. First, distinct behavior toward women might lead to an under or over-investment in female education and thus to differential rates of human-capital accumulation. Second, distinct behavior toward women might affect the balance-of-power women have in their households, and their ability to contribute to consumption and investment decisions.
2 Finally, distinct behavior toward women might trigger a backlash by a 1 Alexander and Welzel (2011) measure "patriarchal values" as a summary index of the three indicators listed above.
2 See Duflo (2012) for a review of the literature on the role of female education and bargaining-power on development outcomes.
1 hosting community that feels culturally threatened. 3 Empirically, scholars have substantiated a link between immigrant attitudes and behaviors, and socio-economic integration. Bisin et al. (2011b) , relying on data from the European Social Survey, show a negative relationship between the strength of an immigrant's ethnic identity and her labor market outcomes. 4 Similarly, Meng and Gregory (2005) and Chiswick and Houseworth (2011) show For purposes of identification of a religious effect on gender behavior, our investigation focuses on a sample of Serer and Joola immigrants to France. Each of these two homogeneous language communities from Senegal is divided along religious lines (Muslim and Catholic), and members from both religions migrated to France at the same time and with the same economic motivations. The results apply only to immigrants from a non-European country of origin. 5 In the late 1990s, approximately 70% of France's Muslims were estimated to originate from North Africa, while 6% were estimated to originate from sub-Saharan Africa (Boyer 1998) . Focusing on a smaller and less visible group of immigrants is fundamental to our identification strategy, but it raises issues of generalizability as well. But since sub-Saharan Africans are less readily associated with Islam than are North Africans (Diop 1988) , our approach is likely to capture a lower bound of the Muslim effect. We further discuss the scope conditions of our research in a later section of this paper. Our experimental results indicate a significant divergence between SM and FFF donations to female recipients, which is not matched by SX and FFF patterns. While FFF and SX players tend to favor women over men, SM male players consistently favor men over women. Furthermore, 6 In this classic experimental game introduced by Kahneman et al. (1986) , players view pictures of people whom they have never met and are given money either to keep for themselves or to share with the person (the "recipient") whose picture they are viewing (being assured that the amounts accruing to each recipient will actually be transferred to them). There is no penalty for keeping the entire amount, and no one can influence the players' donations. In other words, the action of giving in the dictator game is traditionally interpreted as capturing unconditional altruism: it is unconditional because dictator beliefs about recipient behavior cannot be a factor in the donation, given that recipients take no action in this game.
7 This type of manipulation is common in correspondence tests, as in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) . See also Fong and Luttmer (2011) for another example of a dictator game where donors' perception of the recipient is manipulated. 10 Problems undermine their analysis, however: they rely on two populations that share only a small overlap in socioeconomic status, introducing estimation bias in regression analyses. This is because the algorithm used in regression analysis extrapolates from a comparison of those overlapping populations (i.e. rich Muslims with poor Maronites), two sub-sets that surely differ on many unobservables. Our strategy, to be explained in the following section, avoids this problem, as the overlap in socio-economic status between our comparison groups -SM and SX -is large.
In this paper, we extend this research to the context of Muslim immigrants in Christian-heritage societies. We weigh in on the debate about a distinct Muslim/Christian cleavage regarding behavior toward women by comparing the behavior of SM (vs. SX) immigrants and their rooted French hosts toward women. Our contribution lies not only with our focus on behavior, but with our efforts to isolate the effect of religion from that of natural confounds such as race and nationality.
Identifying Muslim immigrant behavior in France
To measure cultural divergence in behavior toward women between Muslim immigrants and their hosts, we designed a dictator game where players have an opportunity to altruistically donate to people whom they do not know. In this game set-up, we analyze differential donations toward men vs. women. Our version of the dictator game was played among a series of experimental games, in which we brought together our Senegalese players and a quasi random sample of residents living in the 19th district of Paris.
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We conducted these experiments in eight sessions over two weekends in March 2009, with at least ten players attending each session. We chose to conduct our games in the 19th arrondissement, a particularly diverse district of Paris. Indeed, according to the 1999 French census, the percentage of individuals living in this district who are born in France is 63.5 (against 82.5 for all Paris). We aimed for an ethnically diverse setting because we did not want any of our players to consider the ethno-religious diversity of our game sessions (and notably the presence of SM and SX players) as exceptional, thus avoiding potential social-desirability bias in their behavior.
We recruited 29 Senegalese players: 18 self-identified as Muslims (SM) and 11 as Christians (SX). These Senegalese Muslim and Christian players were recruited from three separate networks.
Two of the networks came from ethnographers who were conducting family histories for our wider research project; they were asked to recruit Senegalese subjects by merely telling them they had heard about experiments with a chance to earn a lot of money. No mention was made about them for each recipient. Dictators were assured that the amounts accruing to each recipient would actually be transferred to them, and this indeed took place. Dictators were handed a piece of paper and provided with enough space to record their decisions in a private manner, albeit in a public space. 14 We varied the first names of the recipients such that dictators would see the same face but with alternated religious identities [e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) (1) male and female rooted French recipients ({Jean-Marc, Georges} -{Sylvie, Christine}), (2) male and female North African recipients (Mohammed -Farida), and (3) male and female coethnic and co-religious (heretofore in-group) recipients ((Aboubacar -Khadija) for SM, (Michel 14 Players were not prompted as to why they should donate. Our protocol reads: "In this game, we are projecting pictures of individuals on the wall. You will see a total of six pictures, sequentially. For each face, we will give you 5 euros. You are to decide how much of these 5 euros (0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or all of it, 5) you wish to give to the individual in the picture. This individual will never know who you are or how much you will have given him/her. Your decision is therefore entirely private." 8 -Joséphine) for SX, and ({Jean-Marc, Georges} -{Sylvie, Christine} for FFF). A differencein-difference analysis, such as one that compares FFF versus SM dictator donations to female vs.
male recipients, cleanly isolates the effect of gender on generosity levels among dictators of various types. Furthermore, a difference-in-difference-in-difference analysis, which compares the extent to which SM and SX dictators diverge from FFF dictators in their donations to female vs. male recipients, identifies -if it exists -the Muslim effect on behavior toward women.
Our results, from both difference-of-means (Tables 2 and 3 ) and regression (Tables 4 and 5) analyses, indicate that SM dictators distinguish themselves from FFF dictators in a way that SX dictators do not: while both FFF and SX dictators tend to favor women over men in several different contexts, SM dictators favor men over women instead.
15 Tables 2 and 3 , relying on differences-of-means, offer an initial glimpse into the divergent patterns of donations we have identified among SM, SX and FFF dictators. In Tables 2A-2C, focusing on male donations, we see that SM male dictators consistently give more money to men than to women (column (a)), whether the recipient is an average recipient (Table 2A) , a rooted
French recipient (Table 2B) or an in-group recipient (Table 2C) ; by contrast, both SX and FFF male dictators consistently give more money to women than to men (columns (b) and (c) In Tables 4 and 5 , we turn to regression analysis with the following model, applied first to male SM, SX and FFF dictators (Table 4 ) and then to female SM, SX and FFF dictators (Table 5) :
where Donation refers to the amount given by the dictators to the recipients in the dictator game.
The dummy SM → FemaleRecipient is equal to 1 if the dictator is SM and the recipient is female, and to 0 otherwise. Similarly, the dummy SX → MaleRecipient is equal to 1 if the dictator is SX and the recipient is male, and to 0 otherwise; the dummy SX → FemaleRecipient is equal to 1 if the dictator is SX and the recipient is female, and to 0 otherwise; the dummy FFF → MaleRecipient is equal to 1 if the dictator is FFF and the recipient is male, and to 0 otherwise; and the dummy RecipientEthnoReligiousID is a vector of controls for the ethno-religious identity of the recipient (relevant only for the analysis of donations to all recipients) and RecipientFace is a vector of controls for the face of the recipient (relevant only for the analysis of donations to all recipients and to French recipients, since the analysis of donations to in-group recipients already naturally controls for the face of the recipient). We cluster the standard errors at the individual level, since donations from the same player to different recipients cannot be considered as independent from one another. Table 4 presents results from a regression of male dictator donations to all recipients (Model (1)), to rooted French recipients (Model (2)), and to in-group recipients (Model (3)). 19 Three patterns stand out. First, the negative sign on coefficient b 1 indicates that SM male dictators consistently give less money to female recipients than to male recipients, and this holds across all three models. This difference, however, is statistically significant only when it comes to in-group donations (see the p-value for ∆ 1 ). Second, the difference between coefficients b 3 and b 2 indicates that SX male dictators consistently give more money to female recipients than to male recipients, and this also holds across all three models. Moreover, this difference is statistically significant -or closely approaches statistical significance -in all three models (see the p-value for ∆ 2 ). Finally, the difference between coefficients b 5 and b 4 indicates that FFF male dictators also consistently give more money to women than to men across all three models. This difference is statistically significant for Model (1) only (see the p-value for ∆ 3 ). In sum, the direction of donations indicates that SM male dictators distinguish themselves from SX and FFF male dictators; however, statistical significance is not achieved throughout. These patterns are consistent with those identified in our difference-of-means analysis in Tables 2A-C, 
columns (a), (b) and (c).
Our identification strategy requires that we perform a difference-in-difference analysis and systematically compare SM and SX behavior with FFF behavior. This analysis reveals that SX do not diverge from FFF the way that SM do: they either do not differ significantly from FFF (p-values of 0.249 and 0.465 in Models (2) and (3), respectively), or if they do (p-value of 0.031 in Model (1)), it is only because their pro-female bias is substantively smaller than that of FFF male dictators. By contrast, SM male dictators differ substantively and significantly (in Models (1) and (3)) from FFF male dictators, by revealing a pro-male rather than a pro-female bias. These results are consistent with those identified in our difference-of-means analysis in Tables 2A-C, columns (c-a) and (c-b). Consequently, the difference-in-difference-in-difference, comparing the extent to which SM and SX male dictators differ from FFF male dictators in their donations to male vs.
female recipients, confirms a distinct SM pattern across all three models: SM male dictators, who consistently favor male over female recipients, diverge from FFF male dictator behavior more than do SX male dictators, whose pro-female bias mirrors FFF behavior.
dictators, it is a rooted French. it comes to behavior toward women, our SM players distinguish themselves from their hosts in a way that is not apparent for SX players: they favor men over women.
Discussion
Our identification strategy relies on a sample of SM and SX immigrants in France. Our focus on internal validity thus raises two concerns with external validity: the fact that our sample of migrant SM and SX may be systematically different from those who stayed in Senegal; and the fact that we focus on Senegalese Muslims in France rather than North African Muslims, who constitute the large majority of the immigrant Muslim community in France. In this section, we consider the scope of our results. Furthermore, we address the concern that our dictator game might miss 20 We check the robustness of our results by adding, sequentially, controls for: whether the dictator personally knew someone who played in a previous session; the age of the dictator; the religiosity of the dictator; and the education and family income of the dictator, whether the dictator was born in France and whether the dictator is a French national.
We also run all specifications as ordered probit rather than linear regressions. None of the difference-in-difference-indifference results change as a result of these robustness checks.
13 a wider set of intragroup bargains among Senegalese Muslim men and women and thus could underestimate real-world generosity toward women.
First, we consider whether the migrating SM community is significantly different from that which did not migrate, such that the differences we observe in our dictator game are driven by unique characteristics of the SM population sampled. We address this source of bias by turning to behavioral indicators of gender discrimination in Senegal using Afrobarometer data from Senegal.
We merge data from all three rounds (2002, 2005 and 2008) , and focus on a sub-sample of Christian and Muslim respondents from the Joola and Serer language communities. These data allow us to measure behavior by focusing on the three questions that were common to all three rounds and which measured respondent behavior during the interview, rather than attitudes toward survey questions: the interviewer's assessment of whether the respondent's spouse was present during the interview, whether the respondent summoned others to answer questions, and whether the respondent was influenced by others in her responses. Our regression analysis comparing SM and SX male and female respondents includes fixed effects for each of the Afrobarometer rounds, socio-demographic controls of the respondent and the household, and socio-demographic controls of the interviewer; and clusters the standard errors at the regional level. Our results in Table 6 show that what we observed in the laboratory in Finally, one could argue that the differential donations we observe in our dictator game do not capture the fact that Muslims are less generous toward women than are Christians, but the fact that Muslims prefer to support women through alternative channels -for example, by keeping the money they earn in our laboratory games and taking it home to their wives. Put differently, FFF or SX dictators might donate more to Christian women because they view them as more vulnerable and thus deserving of their generosity, while SM might donate less to Muslim women due to the belief that women will be taken care of by their family. We rule out this possibility by emphasizing the fact that Muslims in our experiment (and notably Muslim men) do not discriminate against Muslim women only. What we find is a pervasive lack of generosity toward all women on the part of male Muslim players. When given the opportunity to donate to the average female recipient, or to rooted French female recipients, male Muslim players continue to refrain themselves. Our experiments are thus capturing a phenomenon that cannot be explained merely by intra-group gender bargains.
Conclusion
This paper has identified a distinct Muslim immigrant behavior toward women in France, setting Senegalese Muslims apart from Senegalese Christians and from their rooted French hosts. Relying on a careful identification strategy and analyzing behavior rather than self-reported attitudes, it isolates the religious effect from national, racial and ethnic confounds. Senegalese Muslims, our analysis demonstrates, favor men over women in a lab experiment, while their rooted French hosts favor women over men. This result identifies a specific Muslim effect, since matched Senegalese Christians in the same lab experiment mirror rooted French behavior by favoring women over men. Therefore, this paper not only replicates results from previous survey research [e.g. Bisin et al. (2007) , (2011a) are too important to allow either prejudice or denial to reign.
22 See, for example, Bisin et al. (2011b) . 23 For a summary of this literature, see Duflo (2012) .
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Tables Notes: The table reports arithmetic means for the sub-samples of SM, SX, and FFF players. "Female" is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual is female, and 0 otherwise. "Age" is equal to the age of the individual. "Education" is a categorical variable ranging from 1 (less than primary school completed) to 10 (higher than college degree completed). "Religiosity" is a categorical variable ranging from 1 (never attends religious services) to 7 (attends religious services several times a week). "Political ideology" is a categorical variable ranging from 1 (most left-wing) to 10 (most right-wing). "Born in France" is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual is born in France, and 0 otherwise. "Family income" is a categorical variable ranging from 1 (less than 500 euros a month) to 11 (more than 7500 euros a month). "French national" is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual is a French national, and 0 otherwise. Note that our sample of SM and SX is balanced on all these variables, except for religiosity. Our results hold whether or not we control for these variables. Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is a dyad comprising of a SM, SX or FFF male dictator and one of the six recipients. The dependent variable is categorical, ranging from 0 (the dictator gives nothing to the recipient) to 5 (the dictator gives his total endowment to the recipient). "SM → FemaleRecipient" is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the dictator is SM and the recipient is female, and 0 otherwise. "SX → MaleRecipient" is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the dictator is SX and the recipient is male, and 0 otherwise. "SX → FemaleRecipient" is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the dictator is SX and the recipient is female, and 0 otherwise. "FFF → MaleRecipient" is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the dictator is FFF and the recipient is male, and 0 otherwise. "FFF → FemaleRecipient" is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the dictator is FFF and the recipient is female, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the dictator level. In all tables, * indicates statistical significance at least at the 5% level. Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is a dyad comprising of a SM, SX or FFF female dictator and one of the six recipients. The dependent variable is categorical, ranging from 0 (the dictator gives nothing to the recipient) to 5 (the dictator gives her total endowment to the recipient). "SM → FemaleRecipient" is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the dictator is SM and the recipient is female, and 0 otherwise. "SX → MaleRecipient" is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the dictator is SX and the recipient is male, and 0 otherwise. "SX → FemaleRecipient" is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the dictator is SX and the recipient is female, and 0 otherwise. "FFF → MaleRecipient" is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the dictator is FFF and the recipient is male, and 0 otherwise. "FFF → FemaleRecipient" is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the dictator is FFF and the recipient is female, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the dictator level. It is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the interviewer noted that someone influenced the respondent's answers during the interview, and 0 otherwise. "Female SM respondent" is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent is a female SM, and 0 otherwise. "Male SX respondent" is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent is a male SX, and 0 otherwise. "Female SX respondent" is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent is a female SX, and 0 otherwise. The omitted category is the male SM respondent. "Respondent controls" includes the age and education of the respondent; how often the respondent has gone without food in the previous year; and whether the household is in an urban or rural area. "Interviewer controls" includes the sex, age, education and urban/rural origins of the interviewer. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the regional level. * indicates statistical significance at least at the 5% level. 
